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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
As demonstrated in Appellants' briefs, this Court should reverse the Court of 
Appeals' ruling in Lawrence Colosimo and Jean Colosimo v. Gateway Community 
Church, 2016 UT App 195, 382 P.3d 667 (the "Opinion") and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals to determine other issues. 
In its Opposition brief ("Opposition"), Appellee Gateway Community Church 
("Gateway") concedes numerous material points made in Appellants' brief concerning 
the Opinion's errors. 
Gateway concedes that public safety ordinances can create duties, independent of 
common law duties, even toward trespassers. However, it argues that the Draper City 
Ordinance (Addenda B, C and D to Appellants' Opening Br.) cannot create such a duty 
because the class of persons it seeks to protect is allegedly too "general." Gateway cites 
no law for this proposition. In fact, consistent with the well-established law in Utah and 
other jurisdictions, this Court in Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48,309 P.3d 216, 
recently found duties to "wrongdoers" to whom no common law duty was otherwise 
owed, applying a similar, if not even more "general" public safety statute. 
The Opinion disregarded the applicable law and instead created and applied a new 
and erroneous "strict construction" standard which requires legislative enactments to 
contain an explicit statement that common law was modified and a "list of defenses," in 
order for a duty to attach. Applying the correct Utah law, this Court should find that 
Gateway owed an independent duty under the Draper City Ordinance to Adam, because 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Adam was, by the plain language of the Ordinance, included in the class whom the 
Ordinance sought to protect. 
Gateway's recycled hypothetical about liability to "burglars in the crawlspace of a 
private home" is also misplaced. This case involves a child being electrocuted by coming 
into contact with the easily accessible roof of Gateway's one-story commercial building 
which even Gateway's own board member agreed was essentially a public place. Adam 
was electrocuted and died because Gateway, undisputedly, failed to comply with a 
municipal ordinance intended to protect the public, including trespassers, from the 
potential dangers of electric outdoor signs. 
As to Appellants' common law claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
339, Gateway concedes that the Court of Appeals ruled contrary to Gateway's material 
concession that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gateway knew 
that children were likely to trespass onto Gateway's roof. Because this is the only 
element the Court of Appeals considered with respect to Section 339, this Court should 
reverse the ruling on Section 339 and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider 
the remaining Section 339 elements. 
With regard to the common law claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts 
sections 334 and 335, Gateway also concedes that the lower courts did not require 
Gateway to first demonstrate an absence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
Gateway lmew or had a reason to know of habitual trespassers on its roof and that they 
ignored Gateway's concession as to likely children trespassers on its roof. 
2 
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In an effort to defend these errors, Gateway misconstrues the controlling law 
concerning burdens on motions for summary judgment which this Court articulated in 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P .3d 600 and Connor v. Union Pac., 972 P .2d 414 
(Utah 1998). In that regard, Gateway claims that the lower courts were correct that 
Gateway did not have the initial burden to demonstrate an absence of genuine issues of 
material fact on its motion. Gateway also claims its concession as to likely children 
trespassers on its roof is irrelevant to the analysis concerning habitual trespassers. 
Gateway even claims that the concession was not about whether children were likely to 
trespass onto Gateway's roof, but about children generally climbing roofs. Gateway's 
arguments are not well taken. 
The well-established precedents make clear that the Opinion erred when it ignored 
Gateway's concession as to likely children trespassers on Gateway's roof and Gateway's 
failure to meet its initial burden to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues on the 
questions of whether Gateway had a reason to know of habitual trespassers. 
The Opinion also erroneously ignored the abundant circumstantial evidence 
Appellants presented (despite having no obligation to do so under Orvis and Connor) 
demonstrating that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gateway had 
reason to know of habitual trespassers on its roof under Restatement Sections 334 and 
335. Instead, the Opinion created a bright-line rule pertaining to Sections 334 and 335 
that admitted knowledge of two trespassing incidents is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to landowner's knowledge concerning habitual 
trespassers, regardless of any circumstantial evidence. Utah courts have never endorsed 
3 
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such bright-line rules, and this Court should also refuse to do so here. The reversal of the 
Opinion's rulings on Restatement Sections 334 and 335 is necessary to correct the 
Opinion's errors. 
Finally, Gateway invites this Court to rule on "alternate grounds" and to go 
beyond the scope of Appellants' petition and the Court of Appeals' Opinion. This Court 
should decline Gateway's request because it is contrary to the Utah law which restricts 
the Supreme Court's review on certiorari to a review of on1y the issues raised in the 
Petition for Certiorari and the rulings made by the Court of Appeals. As Gateway 
admits, the Opinion specifically and only addressed the above referenced two issues: (1) 
the issue of duty under the Ordinance; and (2) whether there were genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Gateway lmew or had reason to know about likely children 
trespassers or habitual trespassers on its roof. Appellants' petition did the same. As 
such, much of Gateway's Opposition should be disregarded, and the proper course of 
action is to remand these "alternate" issues for consideration by the Court of Appeals. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Draper Ordinance Created a Duty Toward Adam, Independent of Any 
Common Law Duties, Because Adam Was a Member of the Class the 
Ordinance Was Designed to Protect. 
In its Opposition, Gateway makes a number of arguments about creation of duties 
in Utah, which are addressed below. However, Gateway ultimately concedes that under 
Utah law, Gateway can be liable to Adam under a public safety ordinance, independently 
4 
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of any duties under common law, if the ordinance protects a specific class of which 
Adam is a member. (Opp'n at pp. 3, 47-48.) 
This is not surprising in light of the well-established Utah law governing public 
safety statutes which states that an independent duty can arise, regardless of common law 
duties, where a party can show: "{l) the existence of the statute or ordinance, (2) the 
statute or ordinance was intended to protect the class of persons which includes the 
party, (3) the protection is directed toward the type of harm which has in fact occurred 
as a result of the violation, and (4) the violation of the ordinance or statute was a 
proximate cause of the injury complained of." Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850-51 
(Utah 1981) (emphasis added) ("Warren I") and Hall v. Warren, 692 P.2d 737, 738-40 
(Utah 1984) (" Warren II") (reversing the trial court's judgment adverse to plaintiff under 
a building code ordinance and instructing that duties by a legislative enactment are 
entirely independent and separate from common law duties); Torrie v. Weber County, 
2013 UT 48, ,r,r 10-11, 309 P.3d 216; Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55,985 
P.2d 892, 897-98; Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 285,286, (1965) 874A (1979). 
Notably, Gateway does not dispute that Appellants satisfy prongs (1), (3) and (4) 
listed above. Gateway also does not dispute that the clear purpose of the Ordinance is to 
"protect the health, safety and welfare of City residents ... " by eliminating ''potential 
hazards to the public resulting from improperly constructed or installed signs. " It also 
does not dispute Appellants' prior arguments that the Ordinance specifically required that 
the electric signs be "maintained in good and safe structural condition, in compliance 
with all building and electrical codes and in conformance with this code, at all times." 
5 
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(See also R.1050; 1056-57; 1126-27.) Furthermore, Gateway does not dispute 
"maintained the sign in an unsafe condition in violation of the ordinance," and that Adam 4fv 
was a resident of Draper City who was electrocuted due to Gateway's negligently 
installed and operated electric sign. (R.357(n.3)); see also 1869.) Finally, Gateway does 
not dispute that it was reasonably foreseeable that a trespasser such as Adam could be 
injured or killed ifhe or she came into contact with various parts of Gateway's building 
which were electrified due to the faulty sign. 
Applying basic Utah law, and based on Gateway's own concessions, this Court 
should find that Adam was in the class of persons to whom Gateway owed a duty under 
the Draper Ordinance. 
1. Gateway's Argument That a Public Safety Ordinance Must Be 
More Specific Than the Draper Ordinance in Order For a Duty 
To Exist Is Without Merit. 
While Gateway concedes that the Ordinance protects the class of Draper City 
residents of which Adam was a member, Gateway ultimately argues that the Draper 
Ordinance is too "general" and that legislative enactments must specify a more "narrow" 
class than the Draper Ordinance does, in order to create duties. (Opp'n at pp. 3, 48.) 
Gateway cites no Utah law for this proposition. Not surprisingly, Utah law (see prong (2) 
above) does not limit the size of the "class" which a legislative enactment can seek to 
protect. As demonstrated in the opening brief, this Court and courts in other jurisdictions ~. 
have imposed duties based on language concerning classes protected by "public safety" 
enactments that is similar to the language found in the Draper Ordinance. (See 
6 
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Appellants' Opening Br. at pp. 18-23.) As discussed in Appellants' opening brief, this 
Court's recent decision in Torrie, 2013 UT 48, is a compelling example. 
In Torrie, this Court specifically found a duty was owed to fleeing suspects under 
a public safety statute similar to Draper City Ordinance, to whom no duty was otherwise 
owed. Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,I 11. However, in a strained attempt to distinguish Torrie, 
Gateway argues that it was appropriate for the Court in Torrie to impose a duty toward 
wrongdoers "in derogation of the common law" because the statute in Torrie was 
purportedly more "narrow" than the Draper Ordinance. (Opp'n at pp. 48-49.) To that 
end, Gateway states that the Torrie statute "narrowly" stated that it sought to protect "all 
persons using the highways" as opposed to Draper City Ordinance which used the terms 
"{Draper} City residents," ''people of the City" and ''public" to describe the class of 
persons it intended to protect. (Id.; see also Appellants' Opening Br., Statement of 
Material Facts ("SOF") ,I 5.) Gateway's argument is not well taken. 
Gateway misstates the statute applied by the Torrie court. The Torrie court 
applied Utah Code section 41-6a-212, which does not contain the language "all persons 
using the highways." Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,I 11. In fact, as the Torrie court recognized, 
section 41-6a-212 merely states that operators of authorized emergency vehicles had a 
duty to "act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator in like circumstances ... 
in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law." Id. 1 Based on that language 
1 While the Torrie court discussed its prior decision in Day v State ex rel. Utah Dept. of 
Public Safety, 1999 UT 46, ,I 14, 980 P.2d 1171, it clarified that the Day decision was 
based on the prior statutory language, which unlike the Torrie statute, stated "all persons 
using highways." Notably, even where section 41-6a-212 contained no language as to 
7 
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alone, the Court determined that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that the statute 
intended to protect all members of the public, including the fleeing suspects. Id. 
Ironically, the Draper Ordinance states quite explicitly that it was promulgated to 
protect specifically the "[Draper] City residents" from faulty electric signs, while Torrie's 
section 4 l-6a-212 does not contain such specific language. But even if the Torrie statute 
stated it sought to protect "all persons using highways," this would not help Gateway 
because such "class" would not be any more "narrow" than the class of Draper City 
residents whom the Draper Ordinance seeks to protect. Logically, "all persons using 
highways" could include persons driving, hitchhiking, or biking on the highways - which 
essentially means all members of the "public" who may be in contact with highways. In 
fact, the language "using highways" is superfluous because it would be absurd to expect 
that the statute would seek to protect persons at their homes, when the statute deals with 
highways. In the same fashion, the Draper Ordinance seeks to protect all Draper City 
residents who may come into contact with public commercial buildings which are 
electrified due to faulty electric signs. By the same token, this Ordinance, of course, was 
not designed to protect people from electrified buildings who would not be in contact 
with such building; i.e. a competitor complaining about an electric sign used by a 
business across the street. 
the protection of "all persons using the highways," the Torrie court found that the duty 
imposed is "nearly identical" because, under either statute, fleeing suspects are members 
of general public whom the statute sought to protect. Torrie, 2013 UT 48, ,r 13. 
8 
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2. Gateway's Arguments Concerning Statutory Construction Are 
Erroneous. 
Gateway also adopts the Opinion's erroneous application of strict construction to 
ordinances and argues that Torrie is inapposite because standard construction applies to 
statutes and strict constriction applies to ordinances. {Opp'n at pp. 48-49, 53.) As 
demonstrated in Appellants' opening brief, Gateway's (and the Opinion's) analysis is in 
error. (See Appellants' Opening Br. at pp. 25-28.) 
As a preliminary matter, Gateway's cited cases, like the cases cited in the Opinion, 
specifically and only concerned zoning or land use ordinances and the issue of whether 
these ordinances prohibited a "proposed use." See Carrier v. Salt Lake Cty., 2004 UT 98, 
131, 104 P.3d 1208; Rogers v. W. Valley City, 2006 UT App 302, 115, 142 P.3d 554; 
Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. Of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602,606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Again, even in Patterson, on which both Gateway and the Opinion rely, the Court of 
Appeals specifically warned that there could not be a strict interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance as a whole where there were requirements related to promoting public health, 
safety and welfare. 893 P.2d at 608; see also Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18,119, 20-
21, 70 P.3d 78 ("[i]n interpreting the meaning of ordinances, [courts] are guided by the 
standard rules of statutory construction ... ") (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). Here, Gateway does not argue that the Draper Ordinance impinged on 
Gateway's "proposed use" or that Gateway wished to use the Electric Sign for some other 
purpose not permitted by the Ordinance. As such, this line of cases is simply inapposite. 
9 
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However, it is ultimately of no consequence whether the Court applies strict or 
standard construction to the Draper Ordinance because both require that the Court first 
apply the plain meaning to the Ordinance. Therefore, the Torrie analysis is appropriate. 
Indeed, in looking at the plain language of the Torrie statute which, like the Draper Sign 
Ordinance, "did not carve out any exceptions for [wrongdoers such as] fleeing 
suspects," this Court concluded that, like innocent third parties, even fleeing suspects are 
included in the class of the general public to whom a duty is owed under the statute. 
Torrie, 2013 UT 48,, 11 (emphasis added). The Court did not and could not restrict the 
class which the statute sought to protect - the public who may reasonably be anticipated 
to be harmed by vehicle operators' negligence. Id. at 112, n.18. The Court should, in 
this case, also "decline to "depart from [its] established plain language analysis" and to 
go out of its way to "carve out" an exception for certain members of the class 
(trespassers) from the class of persons to whom the duty is owed under the Draper City 
Ordinance. Id. 2 
Contrary to the plain language of the Ordinance and the controlling Utah law, the 
Court of Appeals did impennissibly carve out an exception for wrongdoers such as 
trespassers. As explained in the opening brief, the Opinion did so based on its newly 
2 Gateway also tries to distinguish Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,, 20, 179 P.3d ~ 
775, which instructs that under the plain language of a statute which derogates land user's 
common law rights, the term "public" obviously includes even criminal trespassers, on 
the grounds that Butler did not involve a safety enactment. (Opp'n at p. 52.) As stated 
above, this distinction is inapposite. Certainly, the Torrie statute was a public safety 
enactment, and in that case the Court found that even wrongdoers are members of the ~, 
public that the public safety enactment sought to protect. 
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created, unprecedented standard of "strict construction" which the Court of Appeals 
patched together based on antiquated and inapposite cases. The "new" standard is bad 
law. As such, the Court of Appeals' ruling concerning duties owed to Adam under the 
Draper City Ordinance should be reversed. 
3. Gateway's Remaining Arguments Concerning Duties Owed 
Under an Ordinance Are Also Without Merit. 
Gateway presented additional arguments which are meritless and immaterial in 
light of Gateway's ultimate concession that, under Utah law, an ordinance can create a 
duty to the members of a class which it seeks to protect. Appellants, nevertheless, 
address those arguments. 
For example, relying on a flawed premise that the Draper City Ordinance should 
be considered a "general" safety ordinance, as opposed to a "specific" ordinance, 
Gateway goes on to argue that "general safety ordinances ... do not create independent 
duties in torf' because, if they did, "a homeowner would be liable to a burglar who is 
injured in the crawlspace of the home due to a violation of a general safety code in the 
crawlspace." (Opp'n at pp. at 3, 47 (emphasis added).) Gateway solely relies on 
Davencourt At Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Assoc. v. Davencourt At Pilgrims 
Landing, 2009 UT 65,221 P.3d 234 ("Davencourt"), for this proposition. However, 
Davencourt does not stand for that proposition. Davencourt did not even involve any 
personal injury, health or safety claims. Instead, it only concerned a plaintiffs 
(unsuccessful) effort to avoid the economic loss rule for property damages under a safety 
statute. Id.,, 43. In fact, contrary to Gateway's argument, the Davencourt court 
11 
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acknowledged that a duty can be created "to the public" by the safety statute such as the 
statute inDavencourt. Id., 1143, 44 (emphasis added). 
As demonstrated above, Gateway's argument is also directly undermined by Utah 
cases, such as Warren I and Warren II, where this Court permitted recovery under a 
similar public safety building ordinance and found that a duty was owed to persons under 
the building code ordinance, independent of any common law duties. Warren I, at 850-
51; Warren II, at 738-40. Notably, in this case, Draper City even anticipated litigation 
and explicitly stated in the Ordinance that there would be no limitation to recovery for 
damages due to the violation of the Ordinance. See Draper City Ordinance (R.1141). 
The scenario involving some "burglars in the crawlspace" and some hypothetical, 
unknown, legislative enactment is not before the Court. Here, Draper City promulgated a 
very specific ordinance concerning the use of commercial electric signs and did not carve 
out trespassers from the class it sought to protect because trespassers, by definition, are 
capable of making, and do make, contact with Draper City's commercial buildings. This 
was especially foreseeable in Draper's busy, commercial areas such as Gateway's one-
story strip mall where Gateway used its electric outdoor sign for advertising and 
attracting business, and where, according to various Draper city officials, it was well 
known that children climbed commercial buildings all over Draper. (R.903-904 ( 4 7 :8-
48: 12); 1023 (96:5-13); 1026 (112:15-21); see also R.560 (29:23-30:4); 572 (77:23-
78: 1).) Of course, contacts with the outside parameters of a building could kill a 
trespasser, an employee, or an invitee all the same, regardless of whether these persons 
made contact with the electrified rain gutter immediately next to the main entrance to 
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Gateway; the electrified one-story, easily accessible roof; or some other part of the 
electrified building. It is common sense that Draper City intended to protect the lives of 
each of those persons. 
Likewise, Gateway's reliance on the antiquated 1926 case, Daley v. Salt Lake & 
U.R. Co., 247 P. 293,294 (Utah 1926), for the proposition that there can be no duty to 
trespassers under a statute is misplaced. As an initial matter, Daley does not even stand 
for that proposition. Also, as stated before, Daley is inapposite as it relied on long-
rejected principles that wrongdoers cannot recover for injuries. See id. (finding that 
court's error concerning a city ordinance jury instruction was harmless because there was 
evidence to preclude the trespasser from recovering any judgment at all). Of course, 
Gateway's (and the Opinion's) interpretation of Daley flies in the face of the well-
established analysis which courts must apply, such as the analysis in Torrie. 
Finally, Gateway tries to distinguish the numerous cases cited by Appellants 
where courts found a duty to trespassers, independent of common law duties, arguing that 
those cases were negligence per se jurisdiction, whereas Utah is a prima face negligence 
jurisdiction. (Opp'n at pp. 47-48.) However, as an initial matter, some of those 
jurisdictions were, in fact, "prima facie evidence" jurisdictions like Utah. See e.g. Allen 
v. Dackman, 991 A.2d 1216, 1231 (Md. Ct. App. 20I0);Paulv. BlackburnLtd. P'ship, 
63 A.3d 1107 (Md. Ct. App. 2013). In any event, Gateway tries to create a distinction 
without meaning to this appeal. The distinction regarding negligence per se jurisdictions 
concerns what the standard of care is - not whether a duty exists. See Thompson v. Ford, 
395 P.2d 62, 33-34 (Utah 1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 286; 288A. It is 
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undisputed that Gateway here breached the standard of care. In any event, as Gateway 
itself ultimately conceded, a duty can be created toward a person "where the ordinance 
protects a specific class" even in a "prima facie evidence" jurisdiction like Utah. (Opp'n 
at pp. 3, 47.) 
B. This Court Should Also Reverse the Court of Appeals' Ruling As to 
Appellants' Common Law Claims. 
In addition to showing that Gateway owed a duty to Adam under the Draper City 
Ordinance, Appellants also demonstrated to the lower courts that there are genuine issues 
of material fact precluding summary judgment on Appellants' common law claims under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 334, 335 and 339. 
However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed fundamental 
procedural errors in their consideration of Appellants' common law claims. As a result, 
the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed the trial court's finding that Gateway owed no 
common law duties to Adam on the sole ground that Appellants purportedly did not 
prove that, under Sections 334-339, Gateway knew or had a reason to know that children 
were likely to trespass or that there were habitual trespassers onto Gateway's roof. 
1. Gateway's Arguments Concerning the Applicable Burdens on 
Motions for Summary Judgment Are Wholly Erroneous. 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely disregarded and 
misapplied the basic Utah law governing evidentiary burdens on summary judgment. As 
Gateway now admits, neither court imposed the initial burden on Gateway to demonstrate 
an absence of genuine issues of material fact on various issues. (Opp'n at pp. 38-39.) 
Also, they ignored, among other things, Gateway's explicit concession that there were 
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genuine issues of material fact as to the question of whether Gateway knew that children 
were likely to trespass onto its roof. (Opp'n at p. 36; R.357(n.3).) 
Recognizing the errors in the Opinion concerning the parties' burdens on 
Gateway's motion for summary judgment, Gateway first argues that this Court should not 
address this problem because it did not grant review of the issue of burdens on the 
summary judgment. (Opp'n at pp. 38-39.) However, the issue of burdens and the 
application of correct standard on a motion for summary judgment is inherent in this 
Court's analysis, and a necessary prerequisite before the Court can determine whether the 
Opinion correctly ruled that Gateway had no knowledge or reason to lmow of the 
trespassers. 
Gateway then argues that the trial court and the Opinion applied the correct 
standard governing motions for summary judgment. (Opp'n at p. 39.) However, 
Gateway misconstrues the basic Utah law, which is stated in Rule 56(c)(l), Connor v. 
Union Pac., 972 P .2d 414 (Utah 1998), and Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P .3d 600, 
when it argues that Gateway had no burden and that the burden is "borne by the party 
with the ultimate burden of proof at trial." (Opp'n at p. 39.) Again, Orvis could not be 
clearer when it states: 
Unless the moving party meets its initial burden ... 'the party opposing the 
motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue 
of material fact for trial' ... Utah law does not allow a summary judgment 
movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's 
~' but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual 
evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 
15 
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Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ,I 16 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Also, in Connor, 
which specifically dealt with the issue of genuine issue of material fact as to habitual 
trespassers, Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment, 
explaining: 
[B]efore determining whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the 
court hearing the motion for summary judgment must be satisfied that the 
moving party has met its burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.... In the instant case, the district court improperly granted 
[defendant's] motion for summary judgment because [defendant] failed to 
meet its burden.... For example, [defendant] states in its summary 
judgment memorandum that ' [ t ]here is no evidence indicating that 
trespassers 'habitually' congregate, loiter or otherwise trespass the area of 
track where plaintiff was injured.' [Defendant], however, fails to support 
this argument with an affidavit or any other evidence. Its argument is 
nothing more than a mere assertion, which is wholly insufficient to support 
a summary judgment motion .... Because [defendant movant] failed to 
show by affidavit or otherwise that the area where [plaindfD was injured 
was not a limited area upon which trespassers constantly intruded, we 
hold that there was a genuine issue of material fact and that the district 
court erred in granting { defendant's] motion for summary judgment. 
Connor, 972 P.2d at 418 (emphasis added). 
Like the defendant in Connor, here Gateway failed to meet its initial burden to 
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact with respect to the only issue 
decided by the Opinion - whether Gateway knew or had reason to know that children 
were likely to trespass onto its roof, or that persons habitually trespassed onto Gateway's 
property. As stated above, Gateway conceded in its motion that Gateway knew or had a 
reason to know that children were likely to trespass onto its roof. (R.357 n.3.) As such, 
had the Opinion followed the basic principles iterated in Connor and Orvis, the burden 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should not have shifted to Appellants to demonstrate presence of genuine issues of 
material fact on these issues. 
While Gateway ultimately admits that the Court of Appeals erroneously found that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of whether children were 
likely to trespass onto Gateway's roof,3 Gateway argues that its concession as to the issue 
of likely children trespassers is irrelevant to the question of Gateway's belief as to the 
likelihood of habitual trespassers on Gateway's roof. (Opp'n at pp. 26-27.) Not so. The 
two issues are inextricably related because the fact that Gateway conceded that children 
were likely to trespass demonstrates that Gateway also did not meet its initial burden of 
demonstrating absence of genuine issue of material as to whether Gateway had reason to 
lmow that persons habitually visited its roof. 
Connor is instructive. In Connor, defendant conceded to even less than Gateway 
did here, only generally arguing that, while there were trespassers in some neighboring 
areas, defendant was simply unaware of any trespassers in the limited area in question. 
Still, this Court found that was insufficient to demonstrate absence of issues of material 
fact as to whether defendants had reason to lmow of habitual trespassers, and it refused to 
3 Gateway argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider Gateway's 
concession because Appellants allegedly failed to distinguish the Section 339 element 
(that Gateway knew or had reason to lmow that children were likely to trespass) from 
Section 334 and 335 elements (that Gateway lmew or had reason to know of habitual 
trespassers). That is incorrect. See e.g. Apr. 7, 2015 Appellants' Opening Br., 2015 WL 
12646934, at pp. 36-37; 48-50; Aug. 19, 2015 Appellants' Reply Br., 2015 WL 
12646933, at pp. 15-17. 
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shift the burden to plaintiff to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. 
Connor, 972 P .2d at 418. The Court should do the same here. 
2. There is an Issue of Fact as to Whether Gateway Knew or Had 
Reason to Know that Persons Habitually Trespassed Onto Its 
Roof. 
Notwithstanding Gateway's failure to meet its initial burden to demonstrate the 
absence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether Gateway had a reason to know of 
habitual trespassers, Appellants presented compelling arguments and evidence that there 
are genuine issues of material fact on this element. 
Certainly, Gateway's concession that there are genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether Gateway lmew that children were likely trespassing onto its roof, raises an issue 
of fact under Restatement Sections 334 and 335 as to whether Gateway also lmew that 
persons habitually trespassed onto Gateway's roof 
So, in an effort to escape reversal, Gateway now, for the first time, argues that this 
concession was not specific as to Gateway's roof, but that it "concerned only whether 
youth are likely to access roofs- any roofs." (Opp'n at pp. 1-2.) But, this Court need 
not look any further than the plain language of the pertinent subsection of the 
Restatement and Gateway's original concession to see that Gateway is misstating the 
facts. Indeed, the pertinent subsection of Restatement Section 339 states that "the place 
where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to lmow ~ 
that children are likely to trespass." Clearly, this subsection refers to Gateway's roof, not 
just any random place where children are likely to trespass. 
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In addition to Gateway's concession as to the likely trespassing by children, 
Appellants raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the knowledge of habitual 
trespassers when they presented both direct evidence of two admitted instances of 
trespass, and abundant circumstantial evidence. Indeed, Gateway's own board member 
agreed that, based on what he understood, the roof was a "public" place. (R.560 (29:23-
30:4); 572 (77:23-78:1).) There was also evidence demonstrating that Gateway knew for 
a long time that there had been a box by the ladder leading to the roof which made access 
to this one-story building's roof even easier. (See R.792-93.) There were many instances 
of persons loitering around the ladder, using graffiti, and even break-ins around the 
ladder. Id. Based on the totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Appellants, the Opinion should have found that there were genuine issues of material fact 
as to whether Gateway had a reason to know of habitual trespassers on its roof. 
Instead, the Opinion created a bright-line rule that two instances of admitted 
trespasses cannot be sufficient to create an issue of fact as to habitual trespassers, 
regardless of any concessions or circumstantial evidence. The Opinion's disregard of the 
circumstantial evidence presented by Appellants was in direct violation of the well-
established law that all evidence must be viewed in totality. See Lopez v. Union Pacific 
R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 606 (Utah 1997) and Connor, 972 P.2d at 417-18. Relatedly, the 
Opinion improperly instructs that courts should invade the province of a jury and weigh 
the evidence in determining issues related to reasonableness and credibility. As 
explained in the opening brief, the Opinion's analysis is flawed on numerous other 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
grounds, warranting a reversal of the Court of Appeals' ruling. (Appellants' Opening Br. 
at pp. 33-35.) 
Notably, in its Opposition, Gateway concedes that the Opinion creates a bright-
line rule, but Gateway argues that it was appropriate for the lower courts to disregard all 
circumstantial evidence and only consider the two admitted known instances of trespass. 
(Opp'n at pp. 25-26.) Gateway relies on several cases from other jurisdictions, discussed 
below. However, such cases are not helpful to Gateway, especially in light of Lopez and ~ 
Connor decisions which demonstrate that Utah law does not endorse such bright-line 
rules governing landowner's reasonable belief as to likelihood of habitual trespassers on 
its roof. Connor, 972 P.2d417-18 and Lopez, 932 P.2d at 605. 
The cases cited by Gateway not only fail to support the Opinion's bright-line rule, 
they are also distinguishable on various other material grounds. See e.g. City of Kansas 
v. New York-Kansas Bldg., 96 S.W.3d 846,861 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (no evidence that 
the building owner knew about any trespass); Seward v. Terminal, 854 S.W.2d 426, 429 
(Mo. 1993) and Lindquist v. Albertsons, 748 P.2d 414 (Id. Ct. App. 1987) (single, 
accidental trespass); Boyd v. Conrail, 677 A.2d 1182, 1187 (N.J. Super. 1996) (irrelevant 
issue whether the area in question was "limited"); Politte v. Union Elec., 899 S.W.2d 
590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (expressing it was "questionable" that Missouri courts 
adopted Section 335 and focusing on whether the area was "limited"); Vega v. Northeast ~ 
Illinois Reg'/ RR, 863 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (inapposite, because Utah courts 
have not required that a limited area must be a "beaten" or "well-worn path"); Burgess v. 
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State, 74 A.3d 581, 587-91 (Conn. 2012) and Humphrey v. Glenn, 167 S.W.3d 680,685 
(Mo. 2005) (defendants admitted they lmew of many trespassers). 
This Court should remand this issue to the Court of Appeals and instruct that juries 
(and certainly the court) must view all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the 
light most favorable to Appellants. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, a 
reasonable jury could, like Gateway's own board member, believe that Gateway had a 
reason to know that its roof was treated by trespassers as a "public" place and as such, 
that persons habitually trespassed onto Gateway's roof. 
Where the Opinion applied the wrong evidentiary burden to the common law 
elements and adopted a per se rule on the issue of habitual trespassers, and where 
Appellants presented abundant circumstantial evidence on the issue of Gateway's 
knowledge concerning habitual trespassers, this Court should reverse the Opinion's 
ruling on the common law claims. 
3. This Court Should Decline Appellee's Request to Affirm Lower 
Courts' Decisions On "Alternate Grounds." 
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court is limited to addressing only the rulings 
by the Court of Appeals and, only the rulings which were specifically addressed in 
Appellants' petition for writ of certiorari. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P .2d 852, 
855 (Utah 1998) ("Review of certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' 
decision and is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petitions."); see also Utah 
Code section 78A-3-102(5); Utah R. App. P. 45, 49(a)(4)("[o]nly the questions set forth 
in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."); State 
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v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 18, 76 P.3d 1159 ("on certiorari, [Supreme Court] review[s] 
the decision of the court of appeals, not the ... trial court"). 
Appellee concedes that the Court of Appeals made only two specific rulings: (1) 
that Gateway did not owe Adam a duty under the common law Restatement sections 334, 
335 or 339 because Gateway allegedly did not know there were trespassers; and (2) that 
Gateway did not owe a duty, independent of common law duties, to Adam under the 
Draper City safety ordinance. (Opp'n at pp. 15-16.) Yet, in its brief, Appellee asks this 
Court to affirm the trial court's decision based on "alternate grounds." Specifically, 
Gateway argues that the Court can affirm the decisions below because, for example, (1) 
the dangerous condition allegedly was unrelated to Gateway's activities (see Opp'n 
sections 1.1.2 and 1.2.2); (2) because Gateway allegedly did not know about the 
dangerous condition (Opp'n sections 1.1.3, 1.2.3, and 1.3.1); (3) and because Adam 
allegedly realized that the condition on the roof would kill him (Opp'n section 1.3.2). 
Putting aside the fact that there are genuine issues of material fact as to those 
additional issues, this Court should strike those arguments because they were not 
considered and not ruled on by the Court of Appeals. Additionally, none of the 
arguments related to the proposed "alternate grounds" were "raised in [Appellants'] 
petition," nor did Gateway file a "cross petition" asserting such alternative grounds. See 
Coulter, 966 P.2d at 855. 
Appellee invites this Court to err when it cites Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 113, 
52 P.3d 1158, for the proposition that this Court can affirm the Court of Appeals on an 
"alternate ground." Appellee completely misconstrues the Bailey decision. The Utah 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Supreme Court in Bailey stated that, when exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, it 
"review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court.'" Bailey, 2002 UT 
58,, 8 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Additionally, this Court in Bailey 
specifically and only addressed the issue of whether the Court of Appeal could affirm 
"the trial court's order on alternate grounds." Id. at,, 11-13 (emphasis added). It had 
nothing to do with issues related to a review on certiorari. Indeed, while Appellee' s 
alternate arguments may have been acceptable had this Court retained original 
jurisdiction and was directly reviewing the trial court's decision, Utah law is clear that 
different rules apply on certiorari. See e.g. Coulter, 966 P.2d at 855.4 As such, this 
Court should strike Gateway's "alternate grounds" arguments. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion should be reversed and Appellants should 
be awarded their costs on appeal. Furthermore, this case should be remanded to the 
Court of Appeals for issuance of a new opinion consistent with this Court's decision and 
to address Appellants' other issues on appeal which were not addressed or fully resolved 
by the Opinion. 
4 Consistent with Coulter' s statement of the law, this Court has instructed that, for 
example, where the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling without considering 
alternate grounds argued by the appellee, the Supreme Court is not to consider alternate 
grounds on certiorari, but to remand the case to the court of appeals to consider such 
alternate grounds. See e.g. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,, 24, 100 P.3d 1222; State v. 
Davis, 972 P.2d 388,395 (Utah 1998). 
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DATED this 5th day of May, 2017. 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
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